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The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII:
Strengthening It or Killing It?
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.∗
“This Civil Rights Act is a challenge to all of us to go to work in
our communities and our States, in our homes and in our hearts, to
eliminate the last vestiges of injustice in our beloved country.”1
INTRODUCTION
As President Lyndon Johnson noted 50 years ago, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed to help eliminate injustice and ensure
that all would have a reasonably equal opportunity to enjoy the
riches of American society.2 More specifically, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act (Title VII) focuses on providing equal opportunity
in the workplace, which allows individuals to rise or fall based on
their talent. However, what equal opportunity has meant in the past
and what equal opportunity will mean in the future is contested.
Though the meaning of the basic provisions of a statute that has
been law for 50 years should be settled, Title VII’s meaning is not
settled. Indeed, over the past few years, the Supreme Court has
destabilized the meaning of Title VII by rethinking doctrines that
many thought established.3 How the Supreme Court will shape Title

Copyright 2014, by HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.
∗ Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
1. This quote is from President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s statement
accompanying the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. President Lyndon B.
Johnson, Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill (July
2, 1964) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives
.hom/speeches.hom/640702.asp [http://perma.cc/TZN5-UZS7] (archived Apr. 2,
2014)).
2. Some have suggested employment discrimination law to be a project of
near Biblical proportions. See William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment
Discrimination Law: Does The Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 685 (2010) (“From the beginning, it was
an astoundingly ambitious, and perhaps audacious, project. Congress envisioned a
tower of law that would elevate people, reaching toward the heavens by
attempting to eradicate invidious employment discrimination.”).
3. See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Wild West of Supreme Court
Employment Discrimination Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 577, 577–79 (2010);
see also Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 857, 857 (2010)
(noting that the Supreme Court has begun to shed some of its interpretive
principles in employment discrimination cases as it has abandoned its preference
for deeming similar language in employment discrimination statutes to have the
same meaning).
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VII doctrine and what that will mean for equal opportunity in the
workplace is unclear.
Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating with
respect to an employee’s terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment or compensation because of the employee’s race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin.4 In addition, employers are barred
from discriminating against individuals because they have formally
or informally challenged practices that they believe violate Title
VII.5 Those simple prohibitions have been the subject of discussion
and analysis for 50 years. At times, the Supreme Court has boldly
pushed the limits of Title VII in favor of equality. For example, its
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. confirmed Title VII’s
expansive reach by noting the existence of a disparate impact cause
of action under Title VII.6 Conversely, at times, the Supreme
Court’s support for Title VII’s basic goals has been suspect. During
the late 1980s, the Court’s narrow interpretation of Title VII helped
lead to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.7 The 1991 Act
installed a number of features into the employment discrimination
landscape that significantly altered Title VII, including jury trials
and punitive damages.8
However, in recent years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes has called
into question the future arc of Title VII doctrine.9 The Court appears
ready to redefine nondiscrimination and equality under Title VII.
Indeed, some of the Court’s rulings suggest that a robust quest for
full equality in the workplace may not be achievable without
amendments to Title VII’s current text.10 Rather than broaden Title
VII protections through doctrinal evolution in the same manner that
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
5. See id. § 2000e-3.
6. 401 U.S. 424, 431–33 (1971). Twenty years later, the disparate impact
cause of action was formalized in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071.
7. See Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection out of
Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 428 (2012) (noting that the
1991 Civil Rights Act was passed in response to Supreme Court doctrine).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
9. See infra Part II.
10. Indeed, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007),
triggered the Lilly Ledbetter Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
That Congress had to amend a statute does not necessarily mean that the case at
issue was wrongly decided, at least with respect to precedent. See Charles A.
Sullivan, Raising The Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV.
499, 501 (2010) (“First, Ledbetter was by no means a radical decision; indeed, it
was the logical outgrowth of earlier, very restrictive Supreme Court opinions
interpreting Title VII statute of limitations periods.”).
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some earlier Courts have, the current Court is chipping away at Title
VII’s protections.11 Even in areas in which the Court appears willing
to support a broadened application of Title VII, it has narrowed Title
VII’s effective reach with procedural and substantive roadblocks
that make potential claims less promising. This approach may be by
design or it may be—as the Supreme Court argues in its opinions—
that the Court is merely applying Title VII’s text, with statutory
amendment being the appropriate solution for any of Title VII’s
supposed shortcomings.12
Whether the Court’s chipping away at Title VII is an attempt to
make Title VII into a 21st century diamond, or an attempt to make it
a 21st century pile of diamond dust, or merely an attempt to interpret
Title VII consistent with its text is a matter of opinion. This Article
explores how the Court is interpreting and reinterpreting Title VII
and necessarily considers whether the Court’s reinterpretation will
likely reinvigorate or damage Title VII’s broad goal of workplace
equality. This Article tentatively considers what may be next for
Title VII. Part I briefly discusses Title VII’s scope. Part II notes how
some of the Court’s recent cases affect Title VII doctrine. Part III
suggests how the Court’s decisions may affect Title VII’s ability to
facilitate a broad vision of equality in the workplace.
I. TITLE VII’S SCOPE
Title VII is supposed to help ensure equality in the workplace by
removing barriers that have yielded systematic inequality in that
setting.13 This requires focusing both on the language and structure
of Title VII so that it can be read consistently with its purpose. The
Supreme Court has, in the past, attempted to read ambiguous text
consistent with Title VII’s broader purposes.14 When used properly,
that interpretive method does not override Title VII’s text. Rather, it
confirms the text’s meaning when the text is deemed somewhat
unclear.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) (“If the effect of
applying Title VII’s text is that some claims that would be doomed under one
theory will survive under the other, that is the product of the law Congress has
written. It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is
necessary to achieve what we think Congress really intended.”).
13. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.”).
14. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82
(1998) (interpreting Title VII to encompass same-sex sexual harassment).
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Title VII is broad. It applies to employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations.15 Employers cannot discriminate
with respect to an individual’s or employee’s employment because
of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.16
Likewise, employment agencies cannot refuse to refer an individual
for a job because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.17 Lastly, labor organizations cannot restrict access to
membership in the organization or decline to admit an individual to
an apprentice or training program because of the individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.18 Title VII suggests that those
who control work are supposed to provide work on an equal basis
without respect to certain characteristics that an individual
possesses.
Title VII bars discrimination broadly. It bars intentional
discrimination and retaliation against individuals.19 Title VII bars
intentional discrimination, and some forms of unintentional
discrimination, against groups.20 Title VII allows individuals and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to sue under
Title VII.21 Individuals can sue to address disputes between an
individual employee and an employer.22 The EEOC can sue on
behalf of a person or groups of people.23
Title VII allows broad recovery for discrimination.24 It provides
monetary relief for past harm, allowing recovery for back pay to
cover pay and benefits that an employee would have earned had the
employee not been subject to discrimination,25 as well as
compensatory and punitive damages in certain circumstances.26 It
provides relief for future harm, authorizing reinstatement to a
position or front pay in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
16. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
17. Id. § 2000e-2(b).
18. Id. § 2000e-2(c).
19. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a).
20. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977)
(discussing intentional discrimination); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (discussing unintentional discrimination).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006).
22. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
23. See § 2000e-5(f); e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
24. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Addressing Segregation in the Brown Collar
Workplace: Toward a Solution for the Inexorable 100%, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 447, 449 (2008) (“While the current legal regime typically focuses on
breaking down barriers to entry or opportunity, Title VII also has a history of
broad remedial power over discrimination in the workplace.”).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
26. Id.§ 1981a(a)(1).
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not feasible.27 It also provides non-monetary relief, permitting
injunctive relief and declaratory relief,28 as well as affirmative
action in appropriate cases to address an employer’s structural
discrimination.29
Title VII addresses nearly all discrimination-based workplace
harms.30 It bars discrimination, allows wide recovery for
discriminatory conduct, and encourages challenges to unlawful
employment practices by barring retaliation for challenging such
practices. Title VII covers myriad actors and activities in the
workplace, aiming at small and large issues. Drawn with a wide
reach, Title VII has been amended to remain that way. That breadth
allows for Title VII’s goal—workplace equality—to be met through
aggressive enforcement.
Nonetheless, courts can limit Title VII recovery and restrict its
scope. Some courts have suggested that some discrimination that
appears to violate Title VII may not be compensable because it is
too insignificant to be actionable.31 Similarly, though Title VII bars
retaliation against those who have challenged an unlawful
employment practice, the Court has indicated that some forms of
retaliation may not be compensable.32 Courts have the final say on
Title VII and can limit it as they see fit.33 Unquestionably, the
Supreme Court has limited Title VII in recent years.
II. NOTES ON THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT TITLE VII
JURISPRUDENCE
In the past several years, the Supreme Court has decided various
Title VII cases in ways that may affect Title VII’s effectiveness.
Some of the cases provide employers with additional latitude to
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
29. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1). See generally Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l
Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
30. There is a line between workplace behavior that is covered by Title VII
and workplace behavior that must be tolerated. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (noting that Title VII does not cover all
workplace harm).
31. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms,
Conditions or Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643
(1996); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121,
1122 (1998).
32. For a discussion of the limitations of Title VII retaliation, see Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., The Cost of Non-Compensable Workplace Harm, 8 FIU L. REV.
317, 329–31 (2013).
33. The Supreme Court is the final interpreter of Title VII. See, e.g., Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
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structure the workplace and avoid Title VII liability. Other cases
narrow Title VII’s effect in substantive areas such as disparate
impact and retaliation. Others install procedural impediments that
may limit Title VII recovery. When considered together, the cases
may significantly restrict Title VII’s reach.
A. Employer Latitude
The Court has gradually limited protections for employees under
Title VII by providing employers increasing latitude to structure the
workplace in ways that may facilitate discrimination. Title VII was
designed to restrict the employer’s ability to discriminate but was
not designed to completely eliminate employer autonomy.34
However, when employer autonomy intersects with or leads to
discrimination, Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination ought to
prevail. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has been subtly allowing
employer prerogative to override employment discrimination
statutes by allowing employers to structure their actions to avoid
liability or by removing coverage for decisions that the Court
believes ought to be within the employer’s discretion. This may
affect how well Title VII meets its overarching objectives.
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court addressed
who could be considered a supervisor for purposes of Title VII
hostile work environment (HWE) harassment.35 The issue is
important because a supervisor can trigger HWE liability more
easily than a non-supervisor.36 The Court defined who is a
“supervisor” fairly narrowly, limiting supervisory status for HWE
harassment purposes to workers who can take significant, tangible
employment actions against other employees.37 Restricting
supervisory status so narrowly potentially limits recovery for HWE
harassment. In the process, the Court provided a roadmap for
employers to restrict the workers who can be deemed supervisors for
HWE harassment purposes, potentially narrowing liability for such
harassment even further.

34. That Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees suggests
that many small employers ought to retain the autonomy to run their businesses as
they wish. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
35. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
36. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998).
37. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443 (holding that for purposes of hostile work
environment harassment, a supervisor is an employee who can “effect ‘a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits’”).
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HWE harassment occurs when an employee is subject to
harassment that is significant enough to alter the employee’s terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment but causes no tangible job
detriment.38 When a supervisor is responsible for HWE harassment,
the employer is liable for the harassment unless it can prove a twopart affirmative defense.39 The affirmative defense requires that the
employer prove that it reasonably attempted to address or remedy
the harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to attempt
to avoid the harm from the harassment.40 Conversely, when a nonsupervisor is responsible for HWE harassment, the employer is
liable if it was negligent in allowing the harassment to occur.41
Employer liability for coworker harassment is more limited than it is
for supervisor harassment. Consequently, whether a coworker is a
supervisor or not matters.
The Vance Court analyzed whether a harasser is a supervisor
from the employer’s perspective and narrowly construed who is a
supervisor by focusing on the specific tasks that a supervisor
performs.42 The Court abandoned common definitions of
“supervisor,” focusing on defining “supervisor” for the specific
purpose of determining when the employer should be liable for
HWE harassment.43 In searching for a definition of “supervisor” that
could readily distinguish a supervisor from a coworker, the Court
suggested that such a simple distinction was both necessary and
possible to make in these circumstances.44 The Court ignored the
more nuanced definition of “supervisor” that the EEOC had
developed.45 The Court’s quest yielded a limited definition of
38. For a general discussion of quid pro quo and hostile work environment
harassment, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually
Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 740–43 (2002).
39. See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 764–65.
40. See id. at 765.
41. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452.
42. See id. at 2443.
43. Id. at 2444 (“In general usage, the term ‘supervisor’ lacks a sufficiently
specific meaning to be helpful for present purposes.”).
44. Id. at 2443–44 (discussing the need for a simple definition of “supervisor”
consistent with existing HWE harassment doctrine).
45. Id. at 2443 (“Other courts have substantially followed the more openended approach advocated by the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, which ties
supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another’s daily
work.”). Unfortunately, the Court often does not defer to the EEOC’s judgment on
employment discrimination matters. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:
The Supreme Court and The EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1937 (2006) (“In
the area of federal antidiscrimination law, the U.S. Supreme Court often prefers to
‘chart its own course’ rather than to defer to Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (‘EEOC’ or ‘Commission’) regulations and guidance interpreting
these laws.”).
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“supervisor” that focuses on the supervisor/coworker’s ability to
hire, fire, or take major job actions against the employee.46
The Vance Court suggested that its position is consistent with
the structure of sexual harassment liability and the affirmative
defense.47 Indeed, the Court noted that it ignored colloquial
definitions of “supervisor” because it was attempting to define the
word in the context of existing HWE doctrine.48 However, the Court
has mixed two different concepts. The Court’s desire for a clear
definition of “supervisor” morphed into the desire for an easy-toapply definition of “supervisor” and resulted in a limited definition
of “supervisor.” The definition the Court adopted may be easier to
apply but may not be particularly related to the original issue
underlying the affirmative defense—when an employer should be
responsible for HWE harassment.49 The affirmative defense to
HWE liability exists to define when the employer should be
responsible for the HWE harassment, e.g., when the act of the
supervisor should be considered the act of the employer or when the
worker responsible has been aided by his or her position as the
employer’s agent.50 Limiting who is a supervisor by using an easyto-apply definition of “supervisor” may limit liability, but it is not
clear that such limitation is more consistent with the purpose of the
affirmative defense than using a somewhat less clear definition.51
Indeed, focusing on the issue from the employee’s perspective rather
than the employer’s perspective, as the Court did, may be sensible.
The Vance Court halfheartedly considered who could be deemed
a supervisor from the employee’s perspective in recognizing the
effect that a putative supervisor/coworker could have on the
employee’s working conditions.52 However, after noting that the
supervisor/coworker in Vance could exercise effective control over
Vance’s work atmosphere and make the work atmosphere very
uncomfortable, the Court noted that a non-supervisory coworker
46. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
47. Id. at 2441.
48. Id. at 2443 (noting that supervisor status is to be determined in the shadow
of Ellerth and Faragher, the two cases that created the HWE affirmative defense
and “presuppose[d] a clear distinction between supervisors and co-workers”).
49. Id. at 2446 (“[T]he term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and
Faragher as a label for the class of employees whose misconduct may give rise to
vicarious employer liability.”).
50. Id. at 2441.
51. The Court would clearly disagree, suggesting that the Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), decisions specifically focus on limiting supervisors to
those with significant power over tangible employment benefits. See Vance, 133
S. Ct. at 2448.
52. Id.
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could do the same.53 Rather than analyze the issue more deeply, the
Court refocused the inquiry on whether the supervisor/coworker had
control over major job decisions. However, how an employee
experiences the supervisor/coworker’s power in the workplace
would also seem relevant to whether the supervisor/coworker was
aided in harassing the employee by the power given to him or her by
the employer—a key issue according to the Vance Court.54 Whether
the supervisor/coworker could exercise coercive power over the
employee would seem to be a reasonable test for whether he or she
has supervisory power under the relevant circumstances. That is,
rather than asking whether the putative supervisor in Vance could
hire and fire, the Court could have asked whether the employee
could treat the putative supervisor just like another coworker without
any repercussions related to the employee’s job duties. If so, the
supervisor/coworker is a coworker; if not, the supervisor/coworker is
a supervisor for HWE purposes. Unfortunately, the Vance Court did
not engage these issues in extended fashion.
Ironically, the HWE affirmative defense could resolve the issue
simply. The affirmative defense requires that the employer
reasonably attempt to prevent or stop the harassment and that the
employee unreasonably fail to prevent or avoid the harassment.55 If
the employer has a reasonable reporting system, the employee who
believes he or she is being harassed by a supervisor will presumably
use the reporting system or lose the case because the affirmative
defense has been proven. However, by determining that the putative
supervisor in Vance was a mere coworker, the affirmative defense
was deemed irrelevant.56 In the process, the Vance Court allowed an
employer to structure the application of Title VII by providing
diffuse supervisory authority that may limit the employer’s
liability.57
The Court’s willingness to give employers additional latitude is
a serious issue. When an employer is allowed to exercise too much
authority in deciding an issue that is fundamental to liability, the
employer effectively controls Title VII’s scope. Vance is not the
only recent case in which the Court has allowed increased employer
latitude. The Court allowed broad employer discretion in Hosanna53. Id. (“The ability to direct another employee’s tasks is simply not
sufficient. Employees with such powers are certainly capable of creating
intolerable work environments, but so are many other co-workers.”).
54. Id. at 2441.
55. Id. at 2439.
56. Id. at 2453.
57. The case is generally pro-employer. See id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.58 Though this case is
not a Title VII case, it is an employment discrimination case that
may affect Title VII doctrine.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court ruled that employees who are
considered ministers by the church-related entities that employ them
cannot sue their employers for employment discrimination.59 The
Court’s decision flows from its recognition of a ministerial
exception based on the First Amendment.60 The Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment combine to allow
churches to choose their own ministers without interference from
government.61 Exposing churches to possible liability from
employment discrimination statutes from church pastors is
considered interference by the government.62 Though the basis for
the exception is not particularly controversial, the exception can be
applied broadly or narrowly.63
The Hosanna-Tabor Court provided the impetus for a possibly
too broad interpretation of the ministerial exception. In that case,
plaintiff Cheryl Perich was fired for threatening to file an Americans
with Disabilities Act lawsuit against her employer, a Lutheran
church school.64 Perich had been a called teacher at the school,
meaning that she had gone through religious training and had been
called by the congregation to her position.65 Before she was called,
she had been a lay teacher at the same school.66 During her tenure as
a called teacher, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy and placed
on medical leave.67 She attempted to return to her position in the
middle of the school year but was told that she had been replaced for
the year by a lay teacher.68 Perich persisted in attempting to return to
her position and was eventually fired when she indicated that she
planned to sue the school.69 The EEOC sued on Perich’s behalf,
alleging retaliation by the school.70 Perich eventually joined the suit
as an intervenor.71 The school moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the ministerial exception shielded its actions from
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id. at 702.
See id. at 709–10.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id.
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review and sanction.72 The school won at the district court but lost at
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.73 The Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and found for the school.74 In ruling
for the church school, the Court rejected the argument that the
position at issue could be, and was in fact, filled by a lay person and,
thus, was not subject to the ministerial exception.75 The Court
focused more on whether the church and school regarded Perich as a
minister than on what the requirements of her position were.76
The broad discretion that a religious employer may exercise
under Hosanna-Tabor is a major concern. The Court suggested that
the case involved a church firing a minister.77 Such a termination
would clearly seem to be covered by the ministerial exception.
However, the case can as easily be construed as involving a church
school firing a teacher. Certainly, the congregation did vote to
rescind Perich’s call.78 However, given that Perich’s position had
been filled by a lay teacher, i.e., Perich, before Perich was called and
was filled by a lay teacher when Perich became ill, it is not clear that
Perich had to retain her call to retain the position.79 Perich clearly
was a minister, and her skills and training as a minister certainly
allowed her to function better in her role as a teacher at the school.80
Whether Perich should have been considered a minister or a school
teacher for purposes of the firing may be a contested question.
However, giving the issue to the employer to decide effectively ends
the discussion and does not provide a clear limit for the ministerial
exception.
Under Hosanna-Tabor, a church school can fire a minister–
teacher who is doing a job that a lay teacher can do. If a lay teacher
is considered to be ministering to children at the church school, it is
not clear that the lay teacher should not be considered a minister for
purposes of the ministerial exception.81 It is unclear whether
Hosanna-Tabor limits how a church or church-related entity
72. Id.
73. Id. at 701–02.
74. Id. at 710.
75. See id. at 708–09.
76. Id. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the
exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment
discrimination suit against her religious employer.”).
77. Id. at 699.
78. Id. at 700.
79. Perich originally requested reinstatement to her position as a called
teacher but abandoned that relief. See id. at 709.
80. See id. at 707.
81. Churches often consider various employees to be ministers. See, e.g.,
Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding
music director to be subject to ministerial exception).
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determines who is a minister or what positions can be deemed
ministerial and, therefore, subject to the ministerial exception. If a
church-related employer can describe nearly all of its employees as
ministers and the inquiry into the employer’s good faith is limited,
the employer’s definition of who is a minister will govern in most
situations.82 It is possible, depending on how Hosanna-Tabor is
read, that the Court believes that the First Amendment requires that
religious employers have such latitude. Nonetheless, if a churchrelated entity does have such latitude, it has the power to restrict the
scope of employment discrimination statutes significantly.
Providing additional employer latitude tends to narrow
protection for workers. Whether Vance and Hosanna-Tabor will
yield little or significant additional employer latitude is unclear.
Other cases may blunt or reinforce employer latitude.83 However,
providing the possibility that employers may be able to manage their
way out of Title VII liability limits Title VII’s effectiveness.
B. Disparate Impact
The Court’s recent jurisprudence appears to narrow the
application of disparate impact discrimination. That is troubling
because disparate impact discrimination is core to Title VII’s
effectiveness. As suggested by the codification of disparate impact
through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress has consistently
defended and championed the need for recompense for disparate
impact discrimination.84 Certainly, the Supreme Court recognizes
that disparate impact cannot be judicially destroyed. However, the
Court appears ready to continually chip away at disparate impact’s
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally.
Disparate impact has been a part of Title VII doctrine since
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. affirmed the existence of a disparate

82. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that courts should defer to the good faith of religious employers).
83. See generally AT&T v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 709–11 (2009) (allowing
employer to decide whether to continue to use rule that perpetuated the effects of
past lawful discrimination); Engquist v. Or. Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 603
(2008) (noting support for allowing employer prerogative to fire based on
irrelevant, but not unlawful, grounds). However, the Court restricted employer
prerogatives in a non-Title VII employment discrimination case ruling that the
contention that the Court rejected might have allowed an employer to shield itself
from liability. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011)
(construing the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
of 1994).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
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impact cause of action in 1971.85 The magnitude of the inclusion of
disparate impact under Title VII cannot be overstated. The inclusion
meant that Title VII was not limited to barring intentional
discrimination.86 The disparate impact cause of action allowed
recovery for an employer’s use of facially neutral rules that had a
disproportionately negative impact on particular groups of
employees.87 Employers could defend the use of the relevant rule or
employment practice on the grounds that business necessity required
the rule.88 However, the need for an employer to defend itself in a
situation in which it had arguably not intentionally discriminated
changed the dynamic of Title VII. Disparate impact liability limits
the exercise of employer prerogative when use of that prerogative
harms certain groups of employees.89 More broadly, with the advent
of disparate impact liability, Title VII bars unintentional
discrimination that could effectively limit members of certain
groups from advancing in the workplace.90 Though disparate impact
necessarily relates to group harm, its focus is not on making sure
that groups do well under Title VII. Rather, disparate impact focuses
on employment practices that are unnecessary to the running of an
employer’s business but harm members of certain groups in greater
proportion than they harm members of other groups.91
The reach of disparate impact, and its focus on employment
practices rather than group harm, became clear in Connecticut v.

85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The disparate impact claim was not created as much
as it was recognized by the Court.
86. However, some argue that disparate impact is a search for discriminatory
motivation. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An
Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987).
87. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (reviewing the
application of height and weight rules that excluded women from certain prison
guard positions).
88. The absence of business necessity doomed the use of the rule. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.”).
89. The paring of prerogative was evident when employers were limited to
giving employment tests that were job related. See Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing when an employment test is sufficiently
job related to overcome disparate impact); see also Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2012) (providing guidelines to
determine job-relatedness of employment tests).
90. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
91. See id. at 431–32. For a discussion of disparate impact within a few
years of its codification by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see Ronald Turner,
Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 447–49 (1995).
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Teal.92 In that case, the Court reviewed the defendant–employer’s
two-step promotion process.93 The first step was a written test that
created an eligibility list of workers who were qualified for
promotion; it had a racially disparate impact.94 The second step,
during which the promotions were made using additional job-related
factors, reversed the effect of the first step such that the group that
was eventually promoted was as diverse as the original pool of
workers who sought promotion and was more diverse than the pool
of workers on the eligibility list.95 The defendant–employer argued
that no disparate impact prima facie case could be made and no
disparate impact claim could succeed if its process as a whole did
not yield a disproportionate impact, i.e., if those promoted were as
racially diverse as those in the original pool for promotion.96 The
Court rejected that “bottom-line” defense, ruling that the use of any
rule or employment practice that yields a disparate impact and is not
backed by business necessity is inappropriate without regard to the
results of the remainder of the process.97 The Teal Court suggested
that disparate impact focuses on the effect that a particular rule has.
Presumably, had the first stage not been in place and the remainder
of the process been kept the same, minorities could have been
promoted at an even higher rate.98 The Teal Court’s effect on
disparate impact doctrine was to bar the use of a rule that may limit
the horizon of minority workers even if the rule is part of a process
that produces demographically fair results.
However, the Court has not been a consistent supporter of a
broad vision of disparate impact liability. The Court was not
particularly solicitous of the disparate impact cause of action in
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.99 Wards Cove was a fairly
complex case that involved seasonal salmon cannery operations.100
The defendant–employer treated cannery workers and non-cannery

92. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
93. Id. at 443–44.
94. Id. at 443.
95. See id. at 444 (noting that the employer chose employees to be promoted
from the eligibility list by considering “past work performance, recommendations
of the candidates’ supervisors and, to a lesser extent, seniority”).
96. See id. at 441–43.
97. Id.
98. Of course, that might have triggered a disparate impact claim from
disgruntled whites. For a discussion of such claims, see Charles A. Sullivan, The
World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims By White Males, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 1505 (2004).
99. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
100. Id. at 646.
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workers differently.101 Not only did cannery and non-cannery
workers work under different conditions, they were hired differently
and paid different wages.102 The groups also had very different
racial compositions, with the cannery workers having a much higher
percentage of native minority workers than the non-cannery
workers.103 A number of cannery workers sued the employer
claiming disparate treatment (intentional) and disparate impact
discrimination.104 The statistical evidence of disparate impact was
limited to comparing the racial makeup of the cannery workers to
the racial makeup of the non-cannery workers.105 Of course, that
comparison was irrelevant when comparing unskilled cannery
workers to skilled non-cannery workers because the very different
skills required for the different types of jobs created different pools
of eligible workers for those jobs, possibly with very different racial
makeups. However, the Court found the statistical evidence
insufficient to support a disparate impact prima facie case even
when unskilled non-cannery workers were compared to unskilled
cannery workers.106 The Court argued that such a comparison was
relevant only if the unskilled cannery workers and the unskilled noncannery workers were chosen from a similar labor pool, without
explaining in much detail why the pools for unskilled cannery and
non-cannery labor would be significantly different.107 The Court
also noted that the plaintiffs had to explain which specific
employment practice caused the disparate impact. Plaintiffs could
not rely on the disparate impact that resulted from an entire
employment process in which several discrete rules were
embedded.108 In addition, the Court appeared to relax the business
necessity standard from Griggs, allowing business necessity to be
met with a reasonable justification for the rule.109
101. Id. at 646–47. See also Saucedo, supra note 24, at 457–59 (discussing
Wards Cove and suggesting that it was an essentially segregated workplace).
102. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 646–47.
103. Id. at 647–48.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 650–51; see also Saucedo, supra note 24, at 457 (“Filipino,
Hispanic, Asian, and Eskimo employees held the unstable, lower-paying, and less
desirable cannery jobs. Anglos held the stable and more desirable noncannery
jobs.”).
106. See Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 653.
107. See id. (noting that the pool of unskilled cannery workers may be different
than the pool of unskilled non-cannery workers even though the skills for the jobs
may be “somewhat fungible”).
108. Id. at 656–57.
109. Id. at 659 (noting that “a mere insubstantial justification . . . will not
suffice” to meet the business necessity standard, but that the employer rule need
not “be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business”).
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Wards Cove was a blow to disparate impact doctrine. Though
the Court did not question the existence of the disparate impact
cause of action, it made the cause of action far more difficult to win.
The proof that the Court appeared to require just to make a prima
facie case appeared significant; the proof necessary to win would be
far more substantial. Given how the Court structured the proof in
Wards Cove, the disparate impact claim appeared to be in serious
trouble. Congress responded to Wards Cove with the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.110
The 1991 Act redefined the disparate impact cause of action in a
manner that reversed Wards Cove in significant measure.111 The
disparate impact cause of action was explicitly codified in the 1991
Act, with its contours made plain.112 Under the 1991 Act, an
unlawful employment practice has been proven when the plaintiff
proves a disparate impact and the employer cannot prove that the
rule or practice involved is job related or based on a business
necessity.113 An unlawful employment practice has been similarly
proven if the plaintiff presented the employer with an alternative
employment practice with less discriminatory effect than the rule at
issue and the employer declined to adopt the alternative practice.114
The plaintiff is also no longer required to identify a specific
employment practice as the cause of a disparate impact in all
instances. If a broad employment practice is composed of several
rules or practices that are difficult to disentangle, the plaintiff may
analyze the broad practice as a single employment practice for
disparate impact purposes.115 The 1991 Act made clear that
disparate impact is an important part of Title VII that would not be
severely limited based on the proof structures that the Supreme
Court constructed.116 Congress’s quick response to a problematic
case suggests that it believed that Title VII remained a primary
avenue to provide equality in the workplace and Title VII’s effects
should not be blunted by unnecessary procedural restrictions.
Almost two decades after Congress reaffirmed the disparate
impact cause of action’s place in the Title VII firmament through the
1991 Act, the Supreme Court muddied disparate impact’s role in
110. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
111. See Saucedo, supra note 24, at 459 (noting that the 1991 Act corrected
many of Wards Cove’s shortcomings).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006).
113. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
114. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
115. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
116. For a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a reaction to Wards
Cove, see Melissa Hart, From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Builtin Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261 (2011).

2014]

THE SUPREME COURT AND TITLE VII

1177

Ricci v. DeStefano.117 Arguably, the Court implicitly questioned the
theory of disparate impact discrimination. In Ricci, New Haven
sought to select captains and lieutenants for its fire department.118
The City gave a written test that counted for 60% of the score and an
oral examination that counted for the remaining 40% of the score.119
The tests had been developed by a firm with experience in
developing such tests.120 After the scores were calculated and the
rank-order eligibility list was created, the City had to decide whether
to certify the list and use the results to choose captains and
lieutenants.121 If the test results were used, the City’s officer rank
would not necessarily have become more diverse.122 In addition,
New Haven recognized that other testing procedures that the City
had yet to try might yield a diverse group of officers.123 The City
had also been told that it would be sued by minority firefighters who
would not be promoted if the list was certified.124 Consequently, the
City declined to certify the eligibility list.125
Firefighters who very likely would have been promoted had the
list been used sued, claiming that the City engaged in intentional
discrimination against them based on race.126 The City defended the
claim arguing that it could refuse to certify the eligibility list
because use of the list would yield a disparate impact.127 The Court
found that the City’s decision to decline to use the results of the test
was intentional discrimination128 and further ruled that such
intentional discrimination could only be justified if the City had “a
strong basis in evidence” to believe that it would be subject to
liability had it not intentionally discriminated.129 The Court
explained that the City did not have a strong basis in evidence
because the test appeared to be job related, i.e., a reasonable judge of
merit for the positions at issue.130 The Court then ruled that the
plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment against New Haven.131
117. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
118. Id. at 562.
119. Id. at 564.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 562–63.
122. Id. at 566.
123. Id. at 570–71.
124. Id. at 562.
125. Id. at 574.
126. Id. at 563.
127. Id. at 572–74.
128. Id. at 563.
129. See id. at 585.
130. See id. at 592 (suggesting no reason for New Haven to believe that the
tests were not job related).
131. See id. at 593.
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The Ricci Court’s position is somewhat inconsistent with the
long history of disparate impact as an integral part of Title VII.
However, the opinion’s harshness comes into full focus when one
considers that the opinion suggested that the majority of the Court
may not believe that disparate impact is a key part of Title VII’s
history. The Court appears to believe that disparate impact was not
an original part of Title VII.132 The Court suggested that the
language of Title VII originally only covered disparate treatment,
with the Griggs Court simply adding disparate impact to Title VII
on its own.133 Consequently, the language of the 1991 Act is the
basis for disparate impact liability. Unfortunately, the Court may
feel free to read the disparate impact cause of action codified in the
1991 Act narrowly, as it appears to believe that the 1991 Act is the
only textual support for the disparate impact cause of action.134 The
Court’s thinly veiled contempt for disparate impact helped convince
it that an employer’s concern about disparate impact is itself the near
equivalent of disparate treatment, i.e., intentional discrimination
against the group favored by the disparate impact. Unfortunately, the
Court echoed its position in Lewis v. City of Chicago, a case
addressing the claims of minority applicants for firefighting jobs in
Chicago.135 The Court’s position is very worrisome if one believes
that disparate impact discrimination must be actionable if Title VII
is to eradicate barriers to workplace discrimination effectively.
The Ricci Court’s hostility to Title VII disparate impact is ironic
given that the Court imported a disparate impact claim into the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in Smith v. City of
Jackson136 when it could have fairly easily denied the existence of
an ADEA disparate impact cause of action.137 However, the Court’s
132. Id. at 577 (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include an express
prohibition on policies or practices that produce a disparate impact.”). See also
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) (“As originally enacted, Title
VII did not expressly prohibit employment practices that cause a disparate
impact.”).
133. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577–78 (noting that Griggs “interpreted the Act to
prohibit, in some cases, employers’ facially neutral practices that, in fact, are
‘discriminatory in operation’”); see also Lewis, 560 U.S. at 211 (noting that
Griggs interpreted Title VII to include disparate impact claims based on 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(2)).
134. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578 (“Twenty years after Griggs, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, was enacted. The Act included a provision codifying
the prohibition on disparate-impact discrimination.”); see also Lewis, 560 U.S. at
212 (“Two decades later, Congress codified the requirements of the ‘disparate
impact’ claims Griggs had recognized.”).
135. Lewis, 560 U.S. 205.
136. 544 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2005).
137. Indeed, the Court had expressed doubts about the existence of an ADEA
disparate impact claim in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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position can be explained in two ways. First, the Court may have
thought that disparate impact is a part of any discrimination scheme
that does not strictly limit itself to intentional discrimination.
Second, the nature and text of the ADEA may contemplate a
disparate impact cause of action even if the language is not explicit.
Of course, either of these explanations appears to fall flat given the
Ricci Court’s suggestion that disparate impact was Court made until
the 1991 Act codified disparate impact.
However, the irony of a Court that seems solicitous of an ADEA
disparate impact claim but hostile to a Title VII claim may fade
away given how the Court has treated the ADEA claim.138 The Ricci
Court recognized the existence of a Title VII disparate impact claim
but narrowed it. Similarly, the Court noted the existence of an
ADEA disparate impact claim but narrowed it. The Court created
the ADEA claim in Smith but gave it a narrow reading.139 The Court
then confirmed the claim in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory but maintained its narrowness.140 Indeed, the Court has
suggested that the ADEA disparate impact claim is narrower than
the Title VII disparate impact claim.141
The Court’s disparate impact doctrine is strange when viewed
through the lens of employer prerogative. Disparate impact claims
arose and became prominent through cases in which employers gave
tests or installed rules that had a disparate impact but could not be
validated as being particularly job related.142 Disparate impact
doctrine rejected the employer’s right to use a test that yields a
disparate impact, unless the test was validated as job related.143 Ricci
appears to change that. After Ricci, an employer that gives a test is
required to use the test results, even if the test yields a disparate
impact, unless the employer can prove that the test is not job
related.144 That restricts the employer’s prerogative to decline to use
test results that yield a disparate impact. Oddly enough, an employer
that gives a test and finds out that the test yields a disparate impact is
not required to validate the test before using it. Rather, it may use
the test results until someone challenges the validity of the test.
Given the thrust of disparate impact—to limit the impact of facially
138. For a more detailed discussion of ADEA and Title VII disparate impact
doctrine, see William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62
SMU L. REV. 81 (2009).
139. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240–43.
140. 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008).
141. Id. at 98.
142. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
143. See, e.g., id; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435–36 (1971).
144. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
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neutral rules that yield disproportionate harm to member of groups
—this is surprising.
Ricci both expanded employer prerogative and limited it. It
allows employers to create whatever tests they want to create, if they
do so in good faith. However, it restricts how the employer may use
or decline to use the test results. The Ricci Court would likely argue
that Title VII requires that limitation because New Haven wanted to
decline to use the test results for a discriminatory reason. However,
the issue is more complex than that because New Haven wanted a
diverse group of commanders in its fire department. Certainly, it
also wanted to test for the best people to fill those spots. However,
when the City realized that following the test results would not
create a diverse command and that there were other testing
procedures that might help it create a diverse command, the city
used its prerogative to decline to use test results that it believed to
reflect talent inadequately.145 The Court rejected that use of
prerogative.146
Whether the Court is intentionally seeking to limit the effect of
disparate impact or does not realize the implications of its decisions
is unclear. However, if the trend continues with the Court treating
cognizance of race or other characteristics as almost equal to
disparate treatment, there could be significant problems for Title
VII. Disparate impact has been a key part of Title VII since 1971
and acts to limit employer prerogative by making clear that rules
that are not triggered by intentional discrimination may yet be
unlawful. Narrowing that understanding is one more problem for
Title VII’s quest to eliminate all workplace barriers to equality.
C. Retaliation
Protection against retaliation is a key part of Title VII. Without
that protection, challenging employment discrimination would be
nearly impossible. Indeed, the Court has inserted retaliation claims
in other statutes where they did not explicitly exist because
protection against retaliation was deemed necessary to protect the
underlying right that was explicitly protected in the statute.147
Without retaliation protection, employees would have a difficult
time protecting their own employment, and very few would engage
145. Id. at 574.
146. See id. at 593.
147. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (finding
retaliation cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); Jackson v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (finding retaliation cognizable under Title IX
private cause of action).
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in actions that might protect the employment rights of others.
Indeed, some argue that protection against retaliation is a necessary
part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.148
The Court has treated Title VII retaliation claims somewhat
similarly to how it has handled Title VII disparate impact claims.
Both retaliation and disparate impact claims are explicitly
recognized in Title VII, so the Court recognizes them.149 Similarly,
the Court has been somewhat solicitous of retaliation claims outside
of Title VII, as it has with disparate impact claims outside of Title
VII. Indeed, the Court has been reasonably supportive of Title VII
retaliation claims, even supporting wider coverage for Title VII
retaliation than some appellate courts initially provided.150 However,
as with disparate impact claims, the Court has narrowed the
retaliation cause of action with procedural roadblocks and
substantive doctrines that will make recovery under retaliation less
likely than it arguably should be.
Title VII bars discriminating against an individual who has
formally or informally participated in challenging an employment
practice that the individual reasonably believes is an unlawful
employment practice.151 The retaliation cause of action that stems
from the prohibition is simple. It requires that the plaintiff prove that
he or she engaged in protected activity and that the employer
discriminated against the plaintiff because of that protected
activity.152 Of course, the Court has interpreted elements of the
148. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as
a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 863 (2008) (“A successful rightsclaiming system must respond to employees’ needs at both ends of the rightsclaiming process, enabling and encouraging employees whose rights are violated
to come forward and protecting them from possible retaliation when they do.”).
149. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k), 2000e-3(a) (2006).
150. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
555 U.S. 271, 273 (2009) (broadening retaliation protection in holding retaliation
“protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on
her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal
investigation”).
151. See § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.”).
152. See Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 674 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“The [retaliation] prima facie case consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff
engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s exercise of her
protected rights was known to defendant; (3) an adverse employment action was
subsequently taken against the employee or the employee was subjected to severe
or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal
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cause of action, including what constitutes causation and what
behavior qualifies as discrimination. Each interpretive step provides
the Court with an opportunity to narrow the retaliation cause of
action.
The causation standard that the Court applied in University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar narrowed the
retaliation cause of action.153 In Nassar, the Court ruled that the butfor causation standard that applies in ADEA non-retaliation cases
should apply in Title VII retaliation cases.154 The decision is
important, in part, because proving that retaliation is the but-for
cause of an employment action is the most difficult form of
causation to prove. However, how and why the Court decided to
apply an ADEA standard to a Title VII retaliation case is just as
important. The Court’s approach suggests a reluctance to expand
Title VII coverage.
The Nassar Court considered the main issue that it resolved to
be a causation issue.155 However, it could have considered the issue
to be an evidentiary or substantive issue related to defining the
substance of the retaliation claim. At base, the Nassar Court had
three options for deciding the causation issue. It could have decided
that the but-for causation standard—a standard that arguably had not
applied to Title VII causes of action since before Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins was decided in 1989—should apply to Title VII
retaliation cases.156 It could have decided that the Price Waterhouse
mixed-motives structure—the causation standard in place before the
Civil Rights Act of 1991—should apply to Title VII retaliation
claims. Lastly, it could have decided that the motiving factor test—
in place for Title VII claims other than retaliation under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991—should define the substance of Title VII
retaliation claims.157 The motivating factor test defines the substance
of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII and subsumes a
causation standard that is more relaxed than but-for causation. The
Nassar Court chose the first path.

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or
harassment.”); Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011) (“To
succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she engaged in a
protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against her, and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse
action.”).
153. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
154. Id. at 2534.
155. Id. at 2522.
156. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
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Title VII does not specify a causation standard. It merely
requires that the plaintiff be harmed because of the employee’s race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin in status-based cases or
because the employee engaged in protected activity in retaliation
cases.158 The causation standard that the Court chose—but-for
causation—is a common tort causation standard. It requires that a
fact finder determine that but for the action taken by the defendant,
the relevant harm would not have occurred.159 In the context of a
standard Title VII case, but-for causation requires that a plaintiff
prove that but for the defendant’s discriminatory animus, the
plaintiff would not have suffered harm. That can be difficult to
prove when the employer claims that a legitimate reason explains
the adverse job action at issue and the employer has sole access to
the reasons an adverse job action was taken. Nonetheless, the but-for
standard arguably applied to Title VII cases decided before Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.160
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court decided that but-for
causation was not the appropriate causation standard in all situations
and causation might be satisfied by something less than proof of
but-for causation in some situations.161 In that case, at issue was
whether the plaintiff was the subject of sex discrimination when the
defendant considered her for partnership.162 Evidence had been
presented that partners had engaged in sex stereotyping and
provided sex-influenced evaluations during the process.163 However,
evidence had also been presented that there were legitimate reasons
for the plaintiff to have been denied partnership.164 The Court
determined that when evidence was presented that could directly
support the contention that sex had been considered when an
employment decision was made, shifting the burden of proof to the
employer to prove that it would have made the same decision had it
not considered the employee’s sex was sensible.165 This is a mixed158. See id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a).
159. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525.
160. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
161. The various justices who wrote opinions in Price Waterhouse advocated
for four different causation standards. For a discussion of Price Waterhouse, see
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2004).
162. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231–32.
163. Id. at 234–35. See also Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of
Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class
Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 45–46 (2009) (discussing evidence presented in
Price Waterhouse and social framework theory).
164. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234.
165. Id. at 258 (“We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that
her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may
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motives standard of proof.166 The focus in a mixed-motives case is
whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to switch the
burden of proof to the employer. This standard appeared short-lived.
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
upended the notion of mixed motives as a proof issue when it
inserted the motivating factor test into Title VII.167
The motivating factor test deems the use of an illegitimate
factor, such as sex, as a motivating factor in employment decisionmaking to be an unlawful employment practice.168 The motivating
factor test is not strictly a causation test; it is a substantive rule. It
defines when an unlawful employment practice has occurred and
creates liability at the moment sex or another illegitimate factor
motivates an adverse employment decision, whether or not the
illegitimate factor is a but-for cause of the employment decision.169
The 1991 Act states that there will be no recovery for substantive
harm if the employer can prove that it would have taken the same
employment action without the unlawful consideration of the
illegitimate factor, i.e., if it can prove that the illegitimate factor was
not a but-for cause of the adverse employment action.170 In that
circumstance, the plaintiff may only receive injunctive or
declaratory relief and may only recover costs and fees.171 The
motivating factor test codifies that Title VII is violated when
discrimination plays a role in a process, not solely when
discrimination is a but-for cause of harm to the employee’s
employment. However, the rule is thought to be a causation test
because it displaces the but-for rule—a clear causation test.
Given the development of causation doctrine under Title VII, the
Nassar Court could have followed the reasoning that prior Courts
had used and concluded that the motivating factor test should apply
to Title VII retaliation claims. Instead, it decided to rethink
causation and installed the but-for causation standard into the Title
VII retaliation cause of action. The Court’s choice to decline to

avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's
gender into account.”) (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 232 (“We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals concerning the respective burdens of proof of a defendant and plaintiff
in a suit under Title VII when it has been shown that an employment decision
resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.”).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
168. See id.
169. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
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apply the motivating factor test to the retaliation cause of action was
not shocking.172 The Court had rethought causation in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.173 Consequently, though Gross was an
ADEA case, the Court’s attempt to rethink causation in a Title VII
retaliation case is not startling.174 However, the reason that the Court
decided to ignore both the motivating factor test and the Price
Waterhouse structure to settle on but-for causation for Title VII
retaliation claims is very surprising.
The Court rejected the motivating factor test for the retaliation
claim and found that the motivating factor test is embedded in a
section of Title VII that only applies to status-based discrimination
claims.175 Given that, the Court found that the motivating factor test
could not apply to the retaliation claim.176 To some, the reasoning is
not convincing, but it could be theoretically sound if one takes a
pure clause-based vision of causation.
The Nassar Court’s reasoning for bypassing the Price
Waterhouse structure is more troubling. The Court treated the
causation issue as though it were a matter of first impression.177 The
Court might argue that causation under the Title VII retaliation
claim was a matter of first impression for the Supreme Court.
However, that is not convincing. Causation is about how to interpret
the term “because of.” That term applies to both the retaliation claim
and the status-based claim. Unless the term is supposed to mean
something different in one part of the statute than it means in
another part of the statute, the Court should not have acted as though
it was writing on a blank slate.
The Court resolved the issue by arguing that the Price
Waterhouse structure had been completely removed from Title VII
doctrine by the 1991 Act.178 The Court appeared to suggest that the
1991 Act removed Price Waterhouse from the entirety of Title VII
because the 1991 Act codified a test that was different from the
172. There are reasons why the Court might not apply the motivating factor
test. For a discussion of the topic in depth, see Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of
“Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why Most Courts Are Not Applying
Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Motivating-Factor
Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But Should), 64
ALA. L. REV. 1067 (2013) (discussing how Title VII retaliation claims should be
analyzed).
173. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
174. See Chambers, supra note 3, at 592 (noting the Court’s willingness to
rethink basic employment discrimination doctrine).
175. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528–29
(2013).
176. Id. at 2534.
177. Id. at 2526–27.
178. See id. at 2534.
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Price Waterhouse structure. That suggestion might seem reasonable
had the 1991 Act altered Price Waterhouse because Congress
wanted a causation standard that better resembled but-for causation.
However, the motivating factor test provides a standard that is more
relaxed regarding causation than the Price Waterhouse standard.179
Consequently, the Court appears to argue that Congress intended to,
or simply did, install the motivating factor test so that it would only
apply to status-based claims and destroyed the more relaxed Price
Waterhouse standard for retaliation claims so that those claims
would be governed by a stricter but-for causation standard. The
Supreme Court may intend for that to be the case, but it is unlikely
that Congress intended for that to be the effect of the 1991 Act.
Once the Court determined that the motivating factor test and
Price Waterhouse were not necessarily applicable to the Title VII
retaliation claim, the Court could rethink causation. Once the Court
rethought causation freely, it could adopt recent cases that had
considered causation issues. In Gross, the Court considered
causation in the context of the ADEA status-based cause of action
and determined that but-for causation applied.180 The Nassar Court
borrowed the reasoning from Gross and installed but-for causation
as its interpretation of what “because of” means for Title VII
retaliation cases.181 That was the Court’s path to narrow Title VII
retaliation claims.
Even though the Court acknowledged—as it had to—that the
retaliation claim is a legitimate cause of action, it narrowed the
cause of action when it logically could have made it broader. In
deciding Nassar, the Supreme Court seemed willing to go only as
far as Title VII explicitly allowed and showed no deference to prior
Courts that had thought about the causation issue. That willingness
to rethink a basic aspect of Title VII is troublesome, given the
Court’s apparent hostility to parts of Title VII.
Even in Title VII retaliation cases where the Court appears to
expand Title VII coverage, it tends to provide an avenue to limit the
eventual coverage. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,
the Court broadened the coverage of Title VII’s retaliation provision
by allowing third-party retaliation claims.182 In that case, the
employer supposedly retaliated against the plaintiff’s fiancé, who
had filed a sex discrimination charge against the employer, by firing

179. See id. (noting that the but-for standard is more demanding than the
motivating factor standard).
180. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
181. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2527–28.
182. 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011).
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the plaintiff.183 The Court ruled that the plaintiff could sue under
Title VII.184 This arguably expanded Title VII retaliation protection.
Title VII bars retaliation when an employee has formally or
informally challenged employer behavior that the employee
reasonably believed is an unlawful employment practice.185 The
plaintiff’s fiancé had engaged in behavior that would trigger
retaliation protection for her, but the plaintiff had not.186
Consequently, the bar on retaliation arguably did not protect him.
However, the Court found that the plaintiff was an aggrieved person
under Title VII who could recover for any unlawful employment
practice that harmed him.187 The retaliation against the plaintiff’s
fiancé—the plaintiff’s termination—was an unlawful employment
practice that harmed the plaintiff.188
The Thompson Court’s decision on third-party retaliation
expands Title VII coverage. However, the Court noted that
actionable retaliation exists only when a reasonable employee would
be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity.189 That left the
scope of liability for retaliation open. The Court noted that the firing
of a close family member would almost always reasonably dissuade
an employee but noted that the infliction of “a milder reprisal on a
mere acquaintance will almost never do so.”190 To be clear, the
question is not whether the mild reprisal or the firing was retaliatory.
The question is whether the clear retaliation against a mere
acquaintance would have dissuaded the employee from engaging in
the protected activity. That is not the obvious import of the text of
Title VII’s retaliation provision. Rather, it is the result of the Court’s
dissuasion standard that stemmed from its interpretation of the
retaliation provision.191
Additional doctrines narrow the retaliation provision.192 For
example, the Court’s temporal proximity doctrine requires that the
employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse
employment action be fairly close in time, though the retaliation
clause has no such requirement.193 Similarly, the Court allows
183. Id. at 867.
184. Id. at 870.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
186. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 867.
187. Id. at 870.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 868.
190. Id.
191. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
192. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 148, at 864 (suggesting that Title VII
lacks sufficient practical protection from retaliation).
193. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)
(discussing temporal proximity). For an in-depth discussion of temporal proximity
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plaintiffs who reasonably believe that they are challenging an
unlawful employment practice to sue an employer.194 However, it is
unclear how much that doctrine protects plaintiffs.195 The Court and
other federal courts do not appear hostile to retaliation cases.196
However, the roadblocks that they are placing in front of retaliation
plaintiffs are no less effective than if they were motivated by
hostility. For those who believe that protection against retaliation is
absolutely necessary to a functioning Title VII, this is very
problematic.
D. Procedural Issues
There are procedural issues, some specific to Title VII and
others not specific to Title VII, that may narrow the opportunity for
Title VII plaintiffs to recover. The Court has tightened pleading
standards. Courts continue to encourage summary judgment. Class
actions may not be as available as they have been in the past. If the
Court continues to encourage such limitations, the possibility that
Title VII will continue to live up to its potential becomes less
likely.197

in Title VII cases, see Troy B. Daniels & Richard A. Bales, Plus at Pretext:
Resolving the Split Regarding the Sufficiency of Temporal Proximity Evidence in
Title VII Retaliation Cases, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 493 (2008).
194. See, e.g., Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C.,
716 F.3d 10, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles,
LLC., 736 F.3d 396, 400–01 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing reasonable belief).
195. For an in-depth discussion of the value of the reasonable belief doctrine,
see Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375 (2010).
196. Indeed, the Court has been generous to retaliation claims in situations
where it need not have been. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011) (ruling that oral complaint satisfied
requirement that plaintiff have “filed any complaint” under Fair Labor Standards
Act).
197. An additional issue that relates to Title VII is the Court’s approval of
forced internal dispute resolution. It may be helpful to employer, but it can create
an additional barrier to Title VII recovery. See Brake & Grossman, supra note
148, at 864 (“The increasing privatization of employment disputes—a recent trend
noted by many scholars—adds to the severity and nature of the problems we
identify. By channeling bias claims into internal dispute resolution processes, in
lieu of or as a prerequisite to the pursuit of formal statutory remedies, employers
have effectively added another layer of obstacles to the enforcement of
employees’ statutory rights.”). Compulsory arbitration of claims has been a
controversial issue for years. See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims With Special Reference to the Three A’s—
Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231 (1996).
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The Court has tightened pleading standards. Rather than allow
pure notice pleading as in the past, the Court is now requiring
plausible pleading.198 Though the Court has yet to explicitly limit
Title VII pleadings, that day may be coming.199 Some might argue
that a plaintiff who cannot meet a pleading standard has little chance
to win. However, that may not be true. More importantly, the
tightening of pleading standards may have the effect of requiring
that Title VII plaintiffs be ready to litigate earlier in the process.
Though that may sound appropriate, it may make Title VII litigation
more costly for plaintiffs, and cases may be less likely to be brought.
Unless costliness is a good proxy for the quality of a case, increasing
the cost to litigate is not likely to increase the quality of the cases
that are brought. If good Title VII cases are not brought, Title VII is
less likely to serve its purposes.
Moreover, federal judges like summary judgment,200 and even
more so in employment discrimination cases than in other types of
cases.201 Whether this is because judges dislike employment
discrimination cases more than other cases or whether employment
discrimination cases are weaker than other cases is not clear.202
However, the incidence of summary judgment is not in question.203
At issue is whether summary judgment is stopping meritorious cases
from being heard. If so, Title VII has very little chance to work as
fully as it should. Given that the Supreme Court has shown no
appetite for lessening the incidence of summary judgment, Title VII
plaintiffs may have to bring higher-quality cases than other litigants
to survive summary judgment. That may not have much effect on
198. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp.,
550 U.S. 644 (2007).
199. See Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2011) (“Several scholars have warned that
plausible pleading poses a particular threat to plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases.”).
200. See Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary Judgments
Entered by the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power,
33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 469 (2009).
201. See Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From The “No Spittin’, No Cussin’
and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to
the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One
Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685 (2012−2013).
202. Of course, weak, but winnable, cases should not be decided on summary
judgment. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication
Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103 (2005).
203. See Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination
Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 672 (2012−2013)
(noting that summary judgment is granted more often in employment cases than in
other cases and discussing why).
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actual judgments, depending on how high the bar for summary
judgment should be.204
In addition, the Court continues to remake its class action
doctrine. A serious discussion of that issue would take a substantial
amount of space. However, a quick word about Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes is necessary.205 In that case, the Court declined to
certify a huge class of about 1.5 million women who were
employees or former employees of Wal-Mart.206 The class
challenged how Wal-Mart promoted and paid its female workers.207
The plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart gave substantial discretion to
managers to use their judgment to make pay and promotion
decisions and that the discretion yielded discriminatory decisions.208
When combined with Wal-Mart’s culture that may have been
particularly susceptible to bias, the plaintiffs claimed that class
certification was appropriate because the class members’ claims met
the commonality requirement.209 The Court decided otherwise and
decertified the class.210
The issue in Wal-Mart is not whether the case was wrongly
decided but how the Court discussed the intersection of
commonality and Title VII. The Court suggested that commonality
was best understood as every class member having the same claim
and the same style of recovery.211 Though the Court loosened the
standard to include situations in which all class members are subject
to employer-wide bias, the Court noted that evidence that was
deemed sufficient for class certification at the district court was not
close to being sufficient to support class certification.212 The district
court may have been wrong about the evidence; however, it may be
that the Wal-Mart Court is suggesting that the kind of evidence that
has been sufficient to support class certification is no longer
sufficient for the task.213 That would be a change that may harm
204. See Chambers, supra note 202, at 131–32.
205. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
206. Id. at 2561.
207. Id. at 2547.
208. See id. at 2554. Of course, the Wal-Mart Court recognized that subjective
procedures could be subject to disparate impact analysis and class recovery. Id.
(citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)). Nonetheless,
the Court declined class certification in this case. Id. at 2561.
209. See id. at 2553.
210. See id. at 2561.
211. See id. at 2550–51.
212. Id. at 2554 (noting that proof was “worlds away from” what was
necessary to support certification).
213. The Court rejected evidence regarding social framework theory, although
it may have been doing more than that. See Hart & Secunda, supra note 163, at 67
(“The debate over admissibility of social framework testimony is one of a set of
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Title VII’s ability to maximize its effectiveness through class
actions.214
III. NEXT STEPS FOR TITLE VII?
The Supreme Court’s approach to Title VII appears to be at odds
with Title VII’s original vision. Title VII provides broad protections
against inappropriate decision-making and unjust decisions made by
employers. Historically, Title VII has been read to expand
opportunities for minority groups. The expansion has often stemmed
from the recognition that Title VII could always be applied in a
more just fashion.215 Simply, Title VII doctrine followed Title VII’s
ideals.
However, some of the Supreme Court’s recent cases have
suggested that the Court will focus its interpretation of Title VII on
its vision of the meaning of Title VII’s text, even if that is
inconsistent with Title VII’s overall vision or the vision that
Congress apparently had when it passed Title VII and its various
amendments. Of course, the Court’s vision is not completely at odds
with prior doctrine. The Supreme Court may be hostile to some
aspects of Title VII, but its recent decisions do not suggest that the
Court plans to erase Title VII from the statute books. Indeed, the
Court is not necessarily openly hostile to Title VII and equality.
Rather, it has a particular vision of Title VII. The Court’s
interpretations may whittle Title VII coverage.
The Court is rethinking Title VII doctrines. It is justifying or
declining to justify those doctrines in ways that are foreign to
traditional Title VII thinking. The Court’s position on disparate
impact and how it relates to disparate treatment is instructive. The
Court has taken disparate impact—a doctrine that has been treated
as an extension of or companion to disparate treatment—and put it
into serious tension with disparate treatment. It has equated the
desire to avoid disparate impact with disparate treatment. If that line
of thinking stands, harmonizing the two styles of discrimination may
become difficult.

arguments presented to courts about which view of Title VII—that requiring
identifiable, invidious intent or that requiring a demonstration of systematic and
obvious disadvantage—should prevail.”).
214. For a suggestion regarding how the EEOC should respond to Wal-Mart,
see Angela D. Morrison, Duke-ing Out Pattern or Practice After Wal-Mart: The
EEOC as Fist, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 87 (2013).
215. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Similarly, the Court is rethinking causation issues. The Court’s
decision to reach back past Price Waterhouse to apply but-for
causation to a Title VII retaliation claim required the Court to reject
its own Title VII doctrine to reach a strange result that some thought
had been buried by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.216 Given how
important the causation standard is when litigating discrimination
claims that can be difficult to prove, the Court’s position is fraught
with peril for Title VII plaintiffs. As important, the Court’s
willingness to ignore or willfully misunderstand Congress’s
suggestion, based on its adoption of the motivating factor test in the
1991 Act, that Title VII is violated when improper motives affect
the decision-making process—not only when harm is actually
visited upon the employee—is troubling. The Court’s approach
suggests a willingness to reinterpret any doctrine that has not been
explicitly stated in Title VII.217 Given this Court’s generally
skeptical outlook on Title VII, that does not bode well for Title VII’s
expansion to limits that will allow Title VII to serve its original
function of promoting full equality in the workplace.
Even when the Court does not rethink fundamental doctrine, it
demonstrates a willingness to narrow Title VII. It is not so much that
specific cases are being decided incorrectly—though some are
arguably being decided incorrectly—it is that the Court’s overall
trend leads away from a robustly enforced Title VII. For example,
its approach to retaliation is to be generally solicitous of the cause of
action.218 However, the Court narrowed retaliation in a way that
may not provide nearly as much protection for the employee as Title
VII might suggest. Logically, the result of narrowing the retaliation
claim will be to discourage employees from challenging unlawful
employment practices. Given that the retaliation clause exists to
support and encourage employees to challenge unlawful
employment practices, the narrowing of the retaliation claim is not
just problematic for the employee; it is problematic for Title VII and
the workplace.

216. See supra Part II.C.
217. See Corbett, supra note 2, at 693 (suggesting that if Congress wants
uniformity in how employment discrimination doctrines are applied, it needs to
provide uniformity through legislation); Michael C. Harper, The Causation
Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and
the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 144–
45 (2010) (noting that interpretive uniformity will have to come through
legislation); Katz, supra note 3, at 889 (suggesting that if Congress wants the 1991
Act standard to apply to all employment discrimination causes of action, it will
have to make that explicit).
218. See supra Part II.C.
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However, the Court’s most important move may have been to
provide additional latitude to employers to structure the workplace
and avoid Title VII liability.219 Given that employers shape the
workplace and its rules, providing additional latitude to the
employer is likely to make the workplace less just. Usually, an
employer can make the workplace more just, if it wants, without
encouragement from Title VII. Indeed, Title VII tends to stop
employers from making the workplace less just. Consequently, little
reason exists to believe that more employer latitude will benefit
employees or necessarily make the workplace more just.
If the current trend continues, Title VII may be whittled down to
its core provisions. Disparate treatment claims, including sexual
harassment claims, will not go away. However, they may become
harder to win. Disparate impact claims will exist but in weakened
form. Disparate impact might only cover clear rules that are
obviously not job related and cause a substantial disparate impact. A
relatively weak retaliation claim that may not embolden employees
to challenge unlawful employment practices may remain. That core
of claims would provide some protection to employees but nothing
like what is necessary for Title VII to meet its potential and its
promise. Unless something changes, this may be Title VII’s brave
new world.
CONCLUSION
There is a core of Title VII that the Supreme Court cannot and
would not dare kill. However, the Court is chipping away at Title
VII. That chipping away is narrowing Title VII’s potential effect.
Unless Congress is ready to defend and amend Title VII when
necessary and make sure that future Supreme Court justices are
going to protect Title VII in a way that the justices have not in the
past few decades, Title VII’s relevance will diminish and workplace
justice will become more difficult to find.
The Court would argue that it is not chipping away at Title VII
or moving it in any particular direction. Rather, the Court would
argue that it is merely deciding the cases that come before it
consistent with Title VII’s text and prior precedent. That is the
standard vision of what a court does, but it is not a complete picture.
As the Supreme Court interprets Title VII, it can always choose
from multiple paths. When choosing a path, the Court can choose a
path that is consistent with Title VII’s purpose and history, or it can
choose a path that may not be consistent with that purpose and
history. The Court has done the latter with respect to a number of
219. See supra Part II.A.
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cases over the past several years. Those actions have eroded Title
VII somewhat. If the Court continues, the erosion will continue.
Title VII is more than just a collection of words. It reflects an
idea. It was drafted and passed with a purpose. Choices that the
Supreme Court makes that appear inconsistent with the statute’s
purpose do not reflect Title VII’s text; they reflect the Court’s
mindset. To ensure that Title VII functions as it should, the Court
ought to change its mindset, with help if necessary.

